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Chapter 46 
The Concept of a ‘Developmental State’ in Ethiopia 
Jostein Hauge and Ha-Joon Chang 
Abstract 
Ethiopia’s rapid economic growth over the past decade, state intervention in the economy, 
and focus on industrialization are prompting characterizations of Ethiopia as a developmental 
state. This chapter discusses the concept of a developmental state in Ethiopia with reference 
to the East Asian developmental state model. It suggests that the Ethiopian state draws 
inspiration from the East Asian developmental state model in many ways. There is a strong 
‘East Asian’ intellectual influence on prominent political figures in Ethiopia, the Ethiopian 
state intervenes heavily in the market, and it has a strong developmental vision to be achieved 
through industrialization. However, in other ways, the Ethiopian development model differs 
from the East Asian developmental state model. Public support for the state’s development 
project is somewhat fragile and fragmented, and the Ethiopian bureaucracy does not have 
much power or independence from the ruling party. 
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46.1 INTRODUCTION 
Characterizations of Ethiopia as a developmental state (DS) have started to become 
commonplace in recent years. Clapham (2017: 1) writes that ‘Ethiopia provides the most 
significant attempt to implement the idea of a “developmental state” in sub-Saharan Africa’. 
Oqubay (2015: 74) describes Ethiopia as an aspiring developmental state. Meles Zenawi 
(Ethiopia’s strongman from 1991 until his death in 2012), the one person who most clearly 
embodied Ethiopia’s vision of development, made a thorough case in an academic book 
chapter for ‘implementing’ a developmental state in Ethiopia—a book chapter entitled ‘States 
and Markets: Neoliberal Limitations and the Case for a Developmental State’ (Zenawi 2012: 
140–74). 
Given Ethiopia’s rapid economic growth, the high degree of state intervention in the 
economy, and the state’s focus on industrialization—somewhat in the image of Japan and the 
‘Asian tiger’ economies1 from which the DS concept emerged—these characterizations of 
Ethiopia as a DS come as little surprise. The inspiration that the Ethiopian state explicitly 
draws from the East Asian development experiences is perhaps the most notable 
manifestation of the implementation of the DS model in Ethiopia. In July 2017, the Financial 
Times published a Big Read on Ethiopia’s development model, focusing on its low-tech 
manufacturing boom and emphasizing how the country is ‘trying to ape the centrepiece of 
Asia-style industrialization’ (Aglionby 2017: 3). Zemedeneh Negatu, a prominent Ethiopian 
businessman, is quoted in the article as saying that the Ethiopian government is 
‘piggybacking on the best elements of China and South Korea, and perhaps, some aspects of 
                                                
1 The ‘Asian tigers’ is a reference to Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan. South Korea 
and Taiwan are more frequently studied in the DS literature, as Singapore and Hong Kong are 
considered more ‘special cases’. 
	
Singapore, with an Ethiopian flavour. And if they get it right, they have a high probability of 
creating an Asian Tiger-like economy in Africa’ (Aglionby 2017: 9). 
This chapter discusses the concept of a DS in Ethiopia. However, it does not do so by 
trying to answer explicitly whether or not the Ethiopian state is a DS. The concept of the DS 
emerged from the development experiences of countries in a particular place (East Asia) at a 
particular point in time (1950s to 1980s, with the exception of Japan, whose rapid economic 
development started in the 1920s). Ethiopia is clearly not Hong Kong, Japan, Singapore, 
South Korea, or Taiwan. However, this does not mean that Ethiopia cannot draw inspiration 
from the development experiences of these countries, or that it is not interesting to see if and 
how Ethiopia is doing so. 
That is why our chapter focuses on questions such as: how has the Ethiopian state been 
drawing inspiration from the East Asian DS model? How is the Ethiopian development 
model different from the East Asian DS model? And how does this translate in terms of 
economic development in Ethiopia (and not in terms of ‘becoming’ a DS)? This is done by 
analysing the ideas that have influenced the political leadership and bureaucracy in Ethiopia; 
the degree of state intervention in the economy; the country’s industrialization trajectory and 
the centrality of industrial policy in it; the sources of the state’s legitimacy; the degree of 
state autonomy (in particular the autonomy of the bureaucracy); and the state’s relationship 
with the private sector. But before addressing these questions, it would be useful to first 
discuss at some length the foundations of the concept of the DS. 
46.2 THE CONCEPT OF THE DEVELOPMENTAL 
STATE: FOUNDATIONS 
	
As mentioned, the concept of the DS emerged from the development experiences of Japan 
and the Asian tiger economies in the post-World-War-II era. So, the first thing we should 
note when talking about the concept is that it is a concept that emerged from a particular 
context/contexts at a particular point/points in time. The second thing to note is that the 
foundations of the DS literature are well defined, so analysing this literature will help us 
understand the concept clearly. The concept was introduced by Chalmers Johnson in his book 
MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925–1975, published in 
1982. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, a stream of literature followed that studied other East 
Asian development experiences, most notably South Korea and Taiwan, using the theoretical 
framework, if not necessarily the concept of the DS. The works in this tradition that have 
come to be considered most seminal in a ‘DS’ sense include Alice Amsden’s Asia’s Next 
Giant (1989), Robert Wade’s Governing the Market (1990), Ha-Joon Chang’s The Political 
Economy of Industrial Policy (1994), and Peter Evans’ Embedded Autonomy (1995).2 
Chalmers Johnson explains that ‘one of my main purposes in introducing the idea of the 
“capitalist developmental state” into a history of modern Japanese industrial policy was to go 
beyond the contrast between the American and Soviet economies’ (Johnson 1999: 32). 
Johnson was trying to describe something that did not fit into the dichotomy of the socialist 
state and the free-market state that was dominant at the time—let us not forget that he was 
writing during the Cold War—to a description of a state that was conjoining private 
ownership with state guidance. The influential works listed above also emphasize the ‘third 
                                                
2 Additionally, Meredith Woo-Cumings’ The Development State (an edited book), published in 1999, 
is a supremely important contribution to understanding the concept of the DS, alongside many 
papers (too numerous to mention) that have been published in the aftermath of the introduction of 
the concept. We acknowledge that the finite list of seminal works that we have proposed is 
certainly debatable. 
	
way’ nature of the East Asian states. The DS concept is therefore a concept of a state that 
allows for the operation of a private market economy but which is highly interventionist and 
certainly not conforming to the principles of neoliberalism or laissez-faire. It is a state that 
‘governs the market’, to paraphrase the title of Wade (1990). 
The DS literature is also consistent in its view of the orientation of the DS: a DS is a 
state that first and foremost is developmental. That is, the East Asian DS model gives its first 
priority to development and treats as secondary other goals, like regulation, social welfare, or 
equality. More specifically, it gives its first priority to economic development through the 
process of industrialization. 
This is why the DS literature puts so much emphasis on industrial policy. According to 
Chang et. al. (2016: 26), industrial policy can be understood as a policy that ‘deliberately 
favours particular industries––or even firms––over others, against market signals, usually to 
enhance efficiency and to promote productivity growth for the targeted industries as well as 
for the whole economy, but also to manage the industries’ decline smoothly’. This is a 
refined definition of the one set out in Chang (1994) and does not differ in any significant 
way from the understanding of industrial policy by the other seminal works in the DS 
literature. Apart from the focus on industrialization as the main ingredient in the process of 
development, we should stress that the concept of industrial policy in the DS literature 
emphasizes the role of the state as one that, again, is not laissez-faire. 
Moreover, the DS literature views the legitimacy of the state as derived from its record in 
economic development. In the words of Johnson (1999: 52), ‘the successful capitalist 
developmental states have been quasi-revolutionary regimes, in which whatever legitimacy 
their rulers possessed did not come from external sanctification or some formal rules whereby 
they gained office but from the overarching social projects their societies endorsed and 
	
carried out’. Legitimation occurs from the state’s achievements, not from the way it came to 
power. This has fuelled some debate over whether a DS can avoid being authoritarian. 
We want to make two points with respect to this debate. First, it is important to highlight 
that while aspects of the DS literature recognize elements of authoritarianism in the DS 
model, it does not accept a necessary connection between authoritarianism and development. 
To the authors advocating the concept of the DS, the real issue is not really authoritarianism 
but the nature of the political system—there are authoritarian states that are predatory, rather 
than developmental. According to Evans (1995: 12), predatory authoritarian states, as 
opposed to developmental authoritarian states, extract resources from the economy (without 
giving back), lack the ability to prevent individual incumbents from pursuing their own goals, 
and create a polity in which personal ties are the only sources of cohesion, and in which 
individual maximization takes precedence over pursuit of collective goals. The second point 
we want to make is that the concept of democracy that is usually used to judge the DS is one 
that is an idealized version of the Anglo-American state structures, which is uncritically 
assumed to be the ‘gold standard’ that every country should aspire to emulate. As Johnson 
(1999: 52) succinctly put it, the legitimacy of developmental states cannot be explained using 
the usual state–society categories of ‘Anglo-American civics’. 
The last point of emphasis we should make about the DS literature is that it looks deeply 
into the functioning of state institutions, particularly into the role of the state bureaucracy and 
how it interacts with the private sector for the purpose of development. Johnson (1982) 
describes a DS bureaucracy as one that is highly capable and committed, usually headed by a 
pilot agency of elite civil servants, which is given the freedom to implement measures as it 
sees fit, unencumbered by the constraints of everyday politics. Evans (1995) emphasizes that, 
additionally, it is important that the bureaucracy understands the needs of the private sector 
but at the same time is sufficiently detached from private-sector interests to avoid having its 
	
independence compromised (a characteristic he famously named ‘embedded autonomy’). 
Putting these together, Woo-Cumings (1999) proposes that a core feature of the East Asian 
DS model is a professional bureaucracy that keeps its distance from everyday politics and 
from the lure of the private sector but at the same time is a partner with the private sector, 
sharing the goal of industrial transformation and having mechanisms to mediate relationships 
between key interest groups. 
The DS literature emphasizes a variety of tools that the state utilizes to ‘steer’ the private 
sector towards industrial transformation. For example, Amsden (1989, 2001) highlights the 
state’s use of reciprocal control mechanisms (RCMs) in Taiwan and South Korea: the state 
would give special favours and assistance to firms in exchange for meeting certain 
performance targets (such as exporting, local contents, or product specifications). Wade 
(1990, 2012) writes how East Asian developmental states were in some instances leading the 
market—when the state made investment decisions that private firms were hesitant to 
make—and in other instances following the market—when the state supported some of the 
bets of private firms. Evans (1995) uses the terms ‘midwifery’ and ‘husbandry’ to describe 
the relations between state agencies and private entrepreneurial groups. He argues that in 
South Korea, the state was able to build on a base of firms with a broad range of related 
industrial skills, fostered by prior midwifery. This allowed the state to shift easily to the 
combination of prodding and supporting, which he calls husbandry. 
While we acknowledge that there is no universally agreed upon definition of a DS and 
that each state that could plausibly be characterized as a DS has unique features, this section 
has attempted to highlight some core characteristics of the DS that will serve as a useful basis 
for discussions in subsequent sections of this chapter. In summary, we argue that the DS is a 
state that (i) emerged from—but is not necessarily confined to–the development experience 
of Japan and the Asian tiger economies; (ii) conjoins private ownership with heavy state 
	
intervention; (iii) gives priority to economic development, which is to be achieved through 
industrialization; (iv) is legitimized from its record in economic development; and (v) has a 
professional bureaucracy that keeps its distance from everyday politics and from the lure of 
the private sector but at the same time is a partner with the private sector, sharing the goal of 
industrial transformation. 
46.3 HOW HAS THE ETHIOPIAN STATE DRAWN 
INSPIRATION FROM THE EAST ASIAN DS MODEL? 
46.3.1 Intellectual Channels and Collaborations 
The influence of the East Asian DS model in Ethiopia goes all the way back to the 
intellectual roots of the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF)—the branch of today’s 
ruling party (the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front, commonly referred to 
as the EPRDF) that has held a majority of influential cabinet positions since 1995. The TPLF 
is known to have had a strong intellectual bent: a fascinating aspect of the party’s intellectual 
drive was the establishment of a business college in Hagereselam towards the end of the 
insurgency against the Derg, a socialist military junta, in the late 1980s. At the business 
college, considerable resources were put into translating the works of Lenin, writing studies 
on Albania’s socialist revolution and, not least, studying South Korean industrial policy 
(Weis 2016). 
The intellectual influence of the state-led industrialization experiences of South Korea 
and other countries in East Asia, such as Japan, Taiwan, and later China on the TPLF cannot 
be understated. A long-time TPLF member and special adviser to the current Prime Minister 
recounted his experience of studying for a distance-taught MBA programme in 1991 at the 
	
Open University in the United Kingdom, together with Meles Zenawi and several other high-
ranking TPLF officials, ‘where we studied in particular the East Asian experience’ (Hauge 
2018: 144). Clapham (2017) argues that it is clear that Ethiopia draws explicitly on the East 
Asian development models, with China as the single most important inspiration, but seeking 
to learn from other cases as well, including South Korea, Taiwan, and Japan. 
According to De Waal (2012), South Korea and Taiwan were Meles’ favourite examples 
of developmental states. In an interview with the New African in 2011, Meles summarized 
Ethiopia’s development model in the following way: 
Essentially, the concept hangs on the prudent combination of market forces and 
state intervention, where the state plays a leading role not only in providing 
infrastructure and basic services, but also in providing the right conducive 
environment for the development of productive and manufacturing capacities. 
For sure, the experience of a number of East Asian countries supports the 
validity of our approach. (New African 2011: 2) 
The influence of the East Asian DS model has not happened purely through ‘intellectual’ 
channels but also more directly through development assistance. Around the time when the 
Ethiopian government was formulating a development strategy for 2010–15, it began regular, 
high-level consultations on industrial policy with a delegation of Japanese experts from the 
Tokyo-based National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS). Meles had approached 
GRIPS at a workshop hosted by the economist Joseph Stiglitz, and between 2009 and 2011, a 
delegation from GRIPS conducted quarterly seminars for the Prime Minster and his 
economic advisers (Weis 2016).3 
                                                
3 Chapter 47 provides detailed information about development cooperation between Japan and 
Ethiopia. 
	
The dialogue focused largely on drafting an economic master plan and turned out to be 
integral to the formulation of the five-year national development plan for the period 2010–15 
(the Growth and Transformation Plan), published by the Ethiopian Ministry of Finance and 
Economic Development. At the core of the plan was an industrialization programme, similar 
to the development plans formulated by the East Asian developmental states. The plan set a 
growth target for the industrial sector at 21.4 per cent per year in the five-year period, 
significantly higher than that of both the agricultural sector (14.9 per cent) and the services 
sector (12.8 per cent). It also emphasized how efforts to develop skills and infrastructure 
should be focused to meet the demands of the growing manufacturing industry (MoFED 
2010). We discuss the centrality of industrialization in Ethiopia’s development model in more 
detail later in the chapter. 
46.3.2 The Rejection of Neoliberalism and the Heavy Hand of the 
State 
As we have seen, one of the core elements of the East Asian DS model is the conjoining of 
private ownership with heavy state intervention and state ownership in key sectors of the 
economy. Naturally, all DS scholars are highly critical of free-market explanations of the 
East Asian development experiences and, more broadly, neoliberalism. 
This rejection of neoliberalism among policy practitioners in the East Asian 
developmental states (and in the DS literature) is also a core feature of the Ethiopian 
development model and TPLF ideology. After all, the TPLF grew out of a Marxist student 
movement in the 1970s. It would not be an exaggeration to call the EPRDF, and in particular 
the TPLF branch of the EPRDF, anti-neoliberal. The EPRDF has consistently been insistent 
on being autonomous from the ideological demands of Western donors, in particular 
Washington Consensus-based institutions. This makes Ethiopia unique in the context of 
	
Africa—a continent where the World Bank and the IMF have had immense influence ever 
since the 1980s. In his book, Globalization and its Discontents, Joseph Stiglitz recounts 
details of his conversations with Meles Zenawi in 1997, Stiglitz’s first year as chief 
economist at the World Bank. At the time, the IMF had suspended its lending programme to 
Ethiopia due to the country’s ‘unstable’ fiscal revenue generation. The IMF demanded 
structural reforms, most importantly liberalization of the financial sector, but Zenawi 
staunchly refused them. Stiglitz, according to his own account, managed to lobby the World 
Bank and, eventually, the IMF to restore development assistance to the country (Stiglitz 
2002). 
The continued unwillingness to liberalize the financial sector is one of Ethiopia’s 
strongest manifestations of the rejection of neoliberalism. The understanding is that foreign 
banks will only be allowed to operate in Ethiopia when domestic banks have developed the 
financial, managerial, and technological capacities to compete against them. For now, most 
medium- to long-term loans for investment projects are provided by the Development Bank 
of Ethiopia (DBE), a state-owned bank. The importance of state-owned banks for funding 
industrial development and long-term investment projects is another similarity that Ethiopia 
shares with the East Asian DS model. For example, in South Korea in 1957, the Korea 
Development Bank (KDB) accounted for 45 per cent of total bank lending to all industries in 
the country (Amsden 2001). More importantly, all banks were nationalized in South Korea 
between 1961 and 1983—the height of the country’s developmentalism. Many of them 
remained state owned until the mid-1990s (Chang 1993). 
The Ethiopian state not only has a heavy hand in the financial sector but also in 
practically every other aspect of the economy. The state-owned Metals and Engineering 
Corporation (METEC) managed by the military stands out as the clearest example. 
Established in 2010 and now the largest industrial complex in Ethiopia with a capital of over 
	
US$1 billion, it has played a key role in the country’s infrastructural and industrial mega-
projects—acting as the primary contractor for engineering works on the Grand Renaissance 
Dam),4 leading the establishment of sugar and fertilizer factories, and assembling carriages 
for the expanding national railway system. It has also been a key player in Ethiopia’s import 
substitution strategy, with its subsidiaries manufacturing everything from AK-47s to 
household furniture, from duffel bags to city buses, and from solar panels to light aircraft 
(Weis 2016). Export-oriented manufacturing industries are also dominated by the state, at 
least among those firms that are domestically owned. For example, three of the four largest 
vertically integrated domestic textile firms are either state owned (Bahir Dar Textile and 
Kombolcha Textile) or affiliated to the TPLF’s endowment fund EFFORT5 (Almeda Textile) 
(Hauge 2018). 
Again, we have a feature shared with the East Asian DS model—the importance of state-
owned enterprises (SOEs).6 South Korea’s steel-maker POSCO, currently the fourth-largest 
steel maker in the world, was established as an SOE in the late 1960s. But Taiwan is the 
country among the Asian tigers in the post-World-War-II era best known for hosting a huge 
SOE sector. In 1952, the SOE sector in Taiwan accounted for 57 per cent of industrial 
production (Amsden 1985). It gradually declined in importance, but still played an important 
role for a long time. Between 1950 and 1980, the average investment share of SOEs in gross 
                                                
4 A hydropower dam on the Nile that will be one of the ten largest hydropower dams in the world 
when it is finished in 2018–19. 
5 EFFORT is the acronym for the Endowment Fund for the Rehabilitation of Tigray. It was 
established and is still controlled (though no longer formally owned) by the TPLF. Its current CEO 
is Azeb Mesfin, the widow of former Prime Minister Meles Zenawi. Its total assets exceed half a 
billion dollars (Weis 2016). 
6 Japan is somewhat of an exception in this respect, as it did not have many SOEs after World War II. 
	
fixed capital formation in Taiwan was 32 per cent, higher than that of other countries with 
sizeable SOE sectors in this time period, such as Singapore, South Korea, and Brazil (Short 
1983).7 
Such heavy state intervention and scepticism about leaving things to the free market begs 
the question of how much space there really is for the private sector in Ethiopia. 
46.3.3 A Developmental Orientation to Be Achieved through 
Industrialization 
Establishing first and foremost whether the Ethiopian state has a developmental orientation is 
not straightforward. As already evidenced at some length in this chapter, the Ethiopian 
government certainly likes to use the phrase ‘developmental state’ with a positive 
connotation to describe the development model of the country (Clapham 2017; Hauge 2018; 
Oqubay 2015). But does the developmental orientation rank as more important than other 
types of state orientation in Ethiopia? It clearly ranks highly but any prominent political 
figure or bureaucrat in Ethiopia would obviously not declare that it ranks higher than an 
‘equality’ orientation or a ‘welfare’ orientation. 
The centrality of national development plans to the political agenda of the Ethiopian 
state can help us understand this though. Since 2005, it appears that five-year national 
development plans have become a staple of the state’s development agenda, starting with the 
Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty (PASDEP), followed by the 
Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP), covering 2010 to 2015, and the Growth and 
                                                
7 However, we should note that today, SOEs play a larger role in Singapore than in any of the other 
Asian tigers—SOEs make up 22 per cent of GDP in Singapore, against Taiwan’s 16 per cent 
(Chang 2014). 
	
Transformation Plan II (GTP-II), covering 2015 to 2020. According to Weis (2016: 90), these 
development plans have become the cornerstone of economic policy in Ethiopia, serving as a 
focal point for coordinating and evaluating the efforts of different ministries and government 
agencies. 
In line with the East Asian DS model, the growth of industry, and the manufacturing 
sector in particular, is a principal feature of these development plans. In the GTP-II, for 
example, the annual growth rate target for the manufacturing sector is 22 per cent, the highest 
growth rate target of any sector of the economy (NPC 2016). 
It is therefore not surprising to see that, alongside these ambitious targets for 
manufacturing development, industrial policy measures have also become more visible, 
particularly since 2005 when the first five-year national development plan was launched. 
Such measures include clear sectoral targeting in national development plans, an expansion 
of the ‘industrial bureaucracy’, state-led credit allocation to prioritized industries, export 
promotion measures, import substitution in certain industries, attraction of FDI, infrastructure 
investments, and the constriction of industrial parks (see Table 46.1 for details. Chapter 35 in 
this book also presents a comprehensive taxonomy of Ethiopia’s industrial policy measures). 
This reinforces the belief that what we are seeing in Ethiopia right now are the beginnings of 
rapid industrialization. It also explains why people, in particular those interested in industrial 
policy in Africa, associate Ethiopia with industrial development (see Hauge and Irfan 2016). 
So, while we cannot assert with certainty that the developmental orientation of the 
Ethiopian state ranks more highly than other types of state orientation, it is clearly of central 
importance. Moreover, in line with the East Asian DS model, industrialization is a core 
feature of the Ethiopian development model, as evidenced by ambitious growth targets for 
the manufacturing sector and the prominence of industrial policy. 
INSERT TABLE 46.1 NEAR HERE (SEE END OF DOCUMENT FOR TABLE) 
	
There is, thus, strong evidence indicating many parallels between Ethiopia’s 
development model and the East Asian DS model. This is evident from both the Ethiopian 
state’s ideological orientation and its economic policies—the state has strong ownership in 
the economy, it is highly critical of neoliberalism, and industrialization is the core feature of 
its development agenda. Some high-ranking politicians of the ruling party (in particular the 
TPLF branch of the party) even explicitly cite the East Asian DS model as an inspiration for 
Ethiopia’s development model. Next, we turn to differences between the Ethiopian 
development model and the East Asian DS model. 
46.4 HOW IS THE ETHIOPIAN DEVELOPMENT MODEL 
DIFFERENT FROM THE CORE FEATURES OF THE 
EAST ASIAN DS MODEL?  
46.4.1 Legitimized from a Record in Economic Development? 
The EPRDF is widely perceived as being controlled by people from the Tigray region (from 
which its initial leadership derived), a small and unrepresentative region in Northern 
Ethiopia. The party’s ascent to power in the early 1990s through an armed struggle bestowed 
no entitlement to rule the country as a whole. According to Clapham (2017), this has imposed 
a need to seek ‘performance legitimacy’ through economic development. In this sense, the 
EPRDF undoubtedly sees itself mirroring aspects of the East Asian DS model—legitimation 
arising from the state’s achievements, not from the way it came to power. 
Can the Ethiopian state show such economic development achievements though? To 
some extent, yes. While real GDP per capita in Ethiopia in 2016 was only US$511 (in 2010 
	
US$)—indicating a low level of economic development—GDP growth and investment rates 
have been high, industrial policy is becoming more pronounced, and the manufacturing 
sector is growing. 
There is also evidence of legitimation arising from public endorsement of high-profile 
development projects. The construction of the Grand Renaissance Dam, the hallmark 
infrastructure project in Ethiopia, serves as a good example. With a budget of close to 
US$6bn, it is the single largest project ever to have been undertaken by an Ethiopian 
government. The dam is financed almost purely domestically, as the World Bank and even 
the Chinese government have been hesitant to fund it because of ‘hydro-political’ 
sensitivities with Egypt. Seeing the unwillingness of international creditors to become 
involved in the project, the government has encouraged public-sector workers and other 
salaried employees to pledge a month’s salary to the project. This has been done by issuing a 
special Renaissance Dam bond that is within the means of domestic savers. The government 
has also enabled the diaspora community to invest in the project by issuing a version of the 
bond denominated in foreign currencies (Berhane 2013). This domestic financing scheme has 
largely worked, as purchasing the bond is seen as a civic duty (Weis 2016). 
Aside from this example, election outcomes in 2010 and 2015 suggest that the EPRDF 
enjoys strong public support. But the legitimacy of this support is controversial as the party 
has systematically closed down space for political dissent, especially since 2005, when the 
EPRDF almost lost the general election. In recent years, public discontent has become more 
visible. Mosley (2016) rightly points out that the state has hyped up expectations for 
economic development to an unrealistic level, which is now producing disillusionment and 
anger, especially among young people. This anger is intensified because of the widespread 
perception that a disproportionate share of the growing economy has gone to ethnic 
Tigrayans, whose TPLF forms the core of the EPRDF. Cracks are appearing in the system of 
	
ethnic federalism—people belonging to the two major ethnic groups, Oromo and Amhara 
(who together represent approximately 61 per cent of the country’s population), have been 
staging anti-government protests because of corruption in the political system and lack of 
equal economic benefits. The conclusion is, therefore, that while public support for the state’s 
high-profile development projects exists, it is highly ethnically fragmented. 
46.4.2 The Independence and Power of the Bureaucracy and the 
State’s Relationship with the Private Sector 
We highlighted in the introduction that a core feature of the East Asian DS model is a 
professional bureaucracy that keeps its distance from everyday politics and from the lure of 
the private sector, but at the same time is a partner with the private sector, sharing the goal of 
industrial transformation, and has mechanisms to mediate relationships between key interest 
groups. While in many ways the industrial policy apparatus of Ethiopia is impressive, as 
already evidenced, it deviates somewhat from this model. 
The size of the bureaucracy concerned with industrial policy in Ethiopia has certainly 
expanded, as seen from Table 46.1, but many of these new institutions either report directly 
to the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO), which micro-manages their operations, or are dwarfed 
in power by the PMO and, more generally, the EPRDF. Oqubay (2015: 76) acknowledges 
that the power and strong organizational capabilities of the EPRDF are used to compensate 
for deficiencies of the bureaucracy. 
The concentration of ‘industrial policy power’ in the ruling party, rather than the 
professional bureaucracy, suggests that the Ethiopian industrial policy regime is rather 
different from the East Asian one. However, if Ethiopia gets it right, does it matter which 
branch of the state is pulling the load? In fact, the characterization of the East Asian DS 
model as one managed by a professional bureaucracy that keeps its distance from everyday 
	
politics is not completely uniform. For example, in Taiwan, a lot of industrial policy was 
formulated by the ruling party, Kuomingtang (KMT). And many important state-affiliated 
enterprises were owned by the KMT, rather than being directly state owned. 
Another distinctive feature of the Ethiopian development model is the small size of the 
domestic private sector in manufacturing industry and the consequent reliance on foreign 
investors. While the domestic private sector in Ethiopia has increased considerably in size 
since the early 2000s, as measured by investment rates, this growth has mostly happened in 
the domestic-oriented service sector (see Chapter 39 for a detailed account of private-sector 
development in Ethiopia). There is simply not much basis for an ‘alliance’ or ‘symbiotic’ 
relationship between the bureaucracy and the domestic private sector (at least that which is 
focused on manufacturing) to exist. The East Asian DS model did to some extent rely on FDI 
though, as Ethiopia is doing now. The most prominent example is Singapore, whose net FDI 
inflows as a proportion of gross fixed capital formation between 1971 and 1995 was 22.9 per 
cent, the highest in the world in this period (Chang 2006). South Korea and Taiwan had more 
restrictive attitudes to FDI (South Korea more so than Taiwan) but it was definitely not 
absent from their development strategies. For example, FDI in South Korea’s textile sector in 
1974 amounted to 20 per cent of total foreign capital in the country (Chibber 1999). In 
Taiwan, 20–25 per cent of manufactured exports came from foreign firms in the 1970s (Wade 
1990). 
The type of policies on which the FDI strategy in the East Asian DS model relied are 
very much in line with Alice Amsden’s framework of RCMs. Financial incentives and 
indirect subsidies were handed out to foreign firms on condition of, most commonly, export 
orientation, sourcing inputs from domestic firms, and engaging in joint ventures with 
domestic firms (Chang et. al. 2016). 
	
The Ethiopian government is handing out financial incentives to foreign investors in a 
similar fashion. In the manufacturing sector, these incentives include exemption from income 
tax for up to ten years, subsidized land lease, and exemption from duties and taxes on 
imported raw material and capital equipment. The degree of generosity of these incentives 
depends on the share of export in output, in line with the East Asian DS model. However, 
apart from that, the attitude to FDI in Ethiopia seems relatively lax, and the Ethiopian 
government has so far not been doing much to ‘nudge’—still less to ‘force’, as the East Asian 
governments did—foreign investors to source locally or to transfer technology to existing 
domestic firms. Formulating such policies would be an important part of trying to build up a 
domestic private sector. 
46.5 HOW HAS THE ATTEMPT TO EMULATE THE 
EAST ASIAN DS MODEL WORKED IN TERMS OF 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN ETHIOPIA (AND NOT 
IN TERMS OF ‘BECOMING’ A DS)? 
Japan and the Asian tigers have arguably been the most successful examples of ‘catch-up’ 
development throughout the history of capitalism. Thus, any catch-up economy today that 
draws the ‘right’ lessons from the East Asian DS model and adapts the model successfully to 
its own circumstances will have good prospects for developing economically. In Ethiopia, is 
there any evidence that the implementation of aspects of the East Asian DS model is 
successfully contributing to economic development? If not (yet), are there prospects of this 
happening? 
	
First, let us look at what has been achieved so far. In terms of economic growth, the 
Ethiopian development push has been impressive. Since 2004, Ethiopia’s economy has been 
booming. Real GDP per capita increased from US$214 in 2004 to US$511 in 2016 (WDI 
2017).8 While acknowledging that this growth has started from a low base, an annual real 
GDP per capita growth rate of 7.5 per cent over a twelve-year timespan is impressive. The 
growth performance comes across as even more impressive when considering that, except for 
Rwanda, Ethiopia is the only country in Africa whose GDP growth has been consistently 
high for over a decade without relying on a natural resource boom (Chang et. al. 2016). 
Part of the growth can be attributed to the growth of the manufacturing sector. Exports of 
manufactured goods grew 21-fold from 2004 to 2015 (from US$21m to US$436m), largely 
thanks to the increasing earnings of the textile and leather industries. This represents more 
than a doubling of manufactured goods’ share in total merchandise exports, which itself grew 
from US$503m to US$3,819m over this period (WTO 2017). However, manufacturing value 
added as a share of GDP in Ethiopia remains 4.8 per cent (WDI 2017), well below the 
African average of 10 per cent (Chang et. al. 2016). 
Seeing that the manufacturing sector is growing but is still not at a point where it is 
contributing significantly to the economy, what other factors then underpin this impressive 
economic boom? Massive federal spending on infrastructure and construction, which has in 
part boosted growth of especially the services sector, has been the most important factor 
(Hauge 2018). More than 40 per cent of the federal budget is spent on infrastructure projects, 
primarily transport and power generation (Oqubay 2015). These infrastructure investments 
are incredibly important for future growth of the manufacturing sector. Without stable 
                                                
8 As measured by constant 2010 US$, meaning that the growth is measured in real terms, not nominal 
terms. 
	
electricity supply and developed road and rail networks, there is little hope of developing an 
internationally competitive manufacturing sector. 
Additionally, Ethiopia has made impressive strides in the areas of education and health 
under the current regime. Net enrolment in primary schools reached 79 per cent in 2014, up 
from only 19 per cent in 1994; and the average life expectancy has hit 64 years, an 
impressive increase of 12 years since 2000 (Oqubay 2015). 
So we can conclude that the numbers indicate a positive trajectory but that it is 
premature to claim success in terms of industrialization and economic development. What 
about future prospects for economic development? It goes without saying that predicting the 
future is a thankless task, but let us try to highlight some important points. 
First, the range of industrial policy measures highlighted in Table 46.1—many of which 
are deliberately modelled on the industrial policies of the East Asian DS model—is a positive 
sign. These measures largely explain the growing anticipation of rapid industrialization in 
Ethiopia. If any African country will become an industrial powerhouse, it is likely to be 
Ethiopia. 
Second, one could legitimately debate the extent to which Ethiopia’s development model 
is endorsed by the public. It is certainly endorsed by many, but the system of ethnic 
federalism and the perception of policies disproportionately marginalizing the Oromo and 
Amhara people means that the development model, as it is structured now, is somewhat 
fragile. However, problems of ethnic strife and, more generally, protests against the national 
government are not unique to Ethiopia—the East Asian countries also had high levels of 
conflict during their developmental periods: Japan lost more working days per worker in 
industrial strikes than did Britain or France (not to speak of West Germany or Sweden) in the 
second half of the 1950s and the first half of the 1960s; the pitched battles that pro-
democracy student demonstrators fought with riot police on the streets of South Korea in the 
	
1970s and the 1980s are world famous; and Taiwan was ruled under martial law until the late 
1980s. The general manager of a foreign footwear company in Ethiopia likened the protests 
right before the declaration of the state of emergency in Ethiopia in October 2016 to those of 
Tiananmen Square in 1989, saying that ‘you can’t have smooth sailing when you’re investing 
in emerging markets’ (Hauge 2018: 169). 
Third, there is an over-reliance on SOEs and foreign firms as actors in the market. The 
East Asian DS model endorses state ownership in the economy but also emphasizes the 
importance of an internationally competitive domestic private sector. A domestic private 
sector is virtually non-existent in Ethiopia at this point, at least in manufacturing industry, 
particularly that which is export oriented. This needs to change if economic growth is to be 
sustained and translate into economic development. 
46.6 CONCLUSION 
Ethiopia’s rapid economic growth over the past decade, the high degree of state intervention 
in the economy, and the state’s focus on industrialization—somewhat in the image of the East 
Asian DS model—are prompting characterizations of Ethiopia as a DS. In this chapter we 
discussed the concept of a DS in relation to Ethiopia. However, we did not do so by trying to 
answer explicitly whether or not the Ethiopian state is a DS. We rather focused on the 
following questions: how has Ethiopia been drawing inspiration from the East Asian DS 
model? How is the Ethiopian development model different from the East Asian DS model? 
And how does this work in terms of economic development in Ethiopia (and not in terms of 
becoming a DS)? 
We used the theory of the DS as a framework to answer these questions. We argued that 
the DS is a state that (i) emerged from—but is not necessarily confined to—the development 
	
experience of Japan and the Asian tiger economies; (ii) conjoins private ownership with 
heavy state intervention; (iii) gives priority to economic development, which is to be 
achieved through industrialization; (iv) is legitimized from its record in economic 
development; and (v) has a professional bureaucracy that keeps its distance from everyday 
politics and from the lure of the private sector but at the same time is a partner with the 
private sector, sharing the goal of industrial transformation. 
Based on this understanding of a DS, it is evident that the Ethiopian state draws 
inspiration from the East Asian DS model in many ways. First, there has been a strong ‘East 
Asian’ intellectual influence on prominent political figures of the ruling party, dating all the 
way back to the 1980s. Second, the Ethiopian state strongly rejects the ideological tenets of 
neoliberalism and has a heavy hand in the economy, manifested especially (albeit not 
exclusively) in state ownership in the economy. Third, the Ethiopian state has a strong 
developmental vision to be achieved through industrialization, evidenced by five-year 
development plans with ambitious growth targets for the manufacturing sector and a range of 
industrial policy measures. 
However, the Ethiopian development model differs from the East Asian DS model in 
other ways. While the EPRDF sees itself deriving legitimacy from a record in economic 
development, including high-profile development projects, rather than procedural 
sanctification—in line with the East Asian DS model—the public support for the state’s 
development projects is ethnically fragmented. Most importantly, there is anger among the 
Oromo and Amhara because of the widespread perception that a disproportionate share of the 
growing economy has gone to ethnic Tigrayans, whose TPLF forms the core of the EPRDF. 
Another deviation from the East Asian DS model is the lack of power and independence 
of the bureaucracy, and the small size of the domestic private sector in manufacturing 
industry. Most ‘industrial policy power’ in Ethiopia lies in the hands of the ruling party, the 
	
EPRDF. The dominant actors in the Ethiopian economy are SOEs and foreign firms. There is 
therefore not much of a basis for the existence of an ‘alliance’ or a ‘symbiotic’ relationship 
between the bureaucracy and the ‘productive’ domestic private sector, which characterized 
the East Asian DS model. 
Ultimately though, the Ethiopian ‘developmental state’, with its many similarities and 
some differences with the East Asian DS model, is leading a positive economic development 
trajectory. Ethiopia has been Africa’s fastest-growing economy for over a decade, 
impressively so without being dependent on a natural resource boom. Most of the growth can 
be attributed to public investments in infrastructure and construction, investments that are 
important for developing an internationally competitive manufacturing sector. The 
manufacturing sector still makes up a small share of the economy in Ethiopia, but the fast 
growth of the sector and all the industrial policy measures formulated in recent years gives 
hope for future success in industrialization. If there is one African country that is likely to 
achieve success in economic development through industrialization under the tutelage of a 




Aglionby, J. (2017). ‘Ethiopia Bids to Become the Last Development Frontier’, Financial 
Times, 3 July. 
Amsden, A. (1985). ‘The State and Taiwan’s Economic Development’, in Bringing the 
State Back In, ed. P. Evans, D. Ruschemeyer, and T. Skocpol (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press): 78–106. 
Amsden, A. (1989). Asia’s Next Giant: South Korea and Late Industrialization (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press). 
Amsden, A. (2001). The Rise of ‘The Rest’: Challenges to the West from Late-
Industrializing Economies (Oxford: Oxford University Press). 
Berhane, D. (2013). ‘Nile: Ethiopians Raise Billions, Despite Foreign-Backed Saboteurs’, 
Horn Affairs English, 29 April. 
Chang, H.-J. (1993). ‘The political economy of industrial policy Korea’, Cambridge 
Journal of Economics, 17: 131–57. 
Chang, H.-J. (1994). The Political Economy of Industrial Policy (Basingstoke: Macmillan 
Press). 
Chang, H.-J. (2006). The East Asian Development Experience: The Miracle, the Crisis and 
the Future (London: Zed Books). 
Chang, H.-J. (2014). Economics: The User’s Guide (London: Penguin Books). 
Chang, H.-J., J. Hauge, and M. Irfan (2016). Transformative Industrial Policy for Africa 
(Addis Ababa: UNECA). 
Chibber, V. (1999). ‘Building a Developmental State: The Korean Case Reconsidered’, 
Politics and Society 27 (3): 309–46. 
Clapham, C. (2017). ‘The Ethiopian Developmental State’, Third World Quarterly. DOI: 
10.1080/01436597.2017.1328982. 
	
De Waal, A. (2012). ‘The Theory and Practice of Meles Zenawi’, African Affairs 112 (446): 
148–55. 
Evans, P. (1995). Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press). 
Hauge, J. (2018). ‘African Industrial Policy in an Era of Expanding Global Value Chains: 
The Case of Ethiopia’s Textile and Leather Industries’, PhD thesis, Cambridge 
University. https://doi.org/10.17863/CAM.20781. 
Hauge, J. and M. Irfan (2016). ‘Why Ethiopia Is on Track to Become Africa’s Industrial 
Powerhouse’, The Conversation, 22 June. 
Johnson, C. (1982). MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy, 
1925–1975 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press). 
Johnson, C. (1999). ‘The Developmental State: Odyssey of a Concept’, in The 
Developmental State, ed. M. Woo-Cumings (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press): 32–
59. 
MoFED (2010). ‘Growth and Transformation Plan 2010/11–2014/15’ Ministry of Finance 
and Economic Development, Addis Ababa. 
Mosley, J. (2016). ‘Ethiopian Politics beyond the Vanguard?’ Chatham House Expert 
Comment, 18 October. 
New African (2011). ‘Zenawi: “We’re on the Right Track”’, New African Magazine 10 
December. 
NPC (2016). ‘Growth and Transformation Plan II 2015/16–2019/20’, National Planning 
Commission, Addis Ababa. 
Oqubay, A. (2015). Made in Africa: Industrial Policy in Ethiopia (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press). 
	
Short, R. (1983). ‘The Role of Public Enterprises: An International Statistical Comparison’, 
Department Memorandum Series 83/84, International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC. 
Stiglitz, J. (2002). Globalization and its Discontents (London: Penguin). 
Wade, R. (1990). Governing the Market: Economic Theory and the Role of Government in 
East Asian Industrialization (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press). 
Wade, R. (2012). ‘How Can Low-Income Countries Accelerate their Catch-Up with High-
Income Countries? The Case for Open-Economy Industrial Policy’, in Good Growth and 
Governance in Africa: Rethinking Development Strategies, ed. A. Noman, K. Botchwey, 
H. Stein, and J. Stiglitz (Oxford: Oxford University Press): 246–72. 
WDI (2017). World Development Indicators online database, World Bank, Washington, 
DC. Accessed December 2017. 
Weis, T. (2016). ‘Vanguard Capitalism: Party, State and Market in the EPRDF’s Ethiopia’, 
D.Phil dissertation, University of Oxford. 
Woo-Cumings, M. (ed.) (1999). The Developmental State (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press). 
WTO (2017). World Trade Organisation trade statistics online database. Accessed 
December 2017. 
Zenawi, M. (2012). ‘States and Markets: Neoliberal Limitations and the Case for a 
Developmental State’, in Good Growth and Governance in Africa: Rethinking 
Development Strategies, ed. A. Noman, K. Botchwey, H. Stein, and J. Stiglitz (Oxford: 





Table 46.1: Taxonomy of Ethiopia’s industrial policy measures 
Sectoral targeting Prioritized industries are clearly articulated in national 
development plans, based on a range of criteria, 
including productive potential, labour intensity, 
linkages to the agricultural sector, technological entry 
barriers, and export potential. These include: leather, 
textiles, metals, agro-processing, chemicals, 
construction inputs, and pharmaceuticals.  
Expansion of ‘industrial 
bureaucracy’ 
 
Several new government agencies have been set up to 
more effectively provide state support to prioritized 
industries. Examples of such institutions would be the 
sectoral development institutes, the Industrial Parks 
Development Corporation, and the Ethiopian Industrial 
Inputs Development Enterprise.  
Credit allocation: Development 
Bank of Ethiopia (DBE) and 
Commercial Bank of Ethiopia 
(CBE) 
These are state-owned banks that provide subsidized 
credit to prioritized industries. The DBE provides 
investment capital, whereas the CBE provides working 
capital. 
 
Export promotion Several incentives are put in place to encourage exports 
in prioritized industries. These incentives are targeted 
at export-oriented firms and include: reduced interest 
rate on loans from DBE and CBE; subsidized leasing of 
land; subsidized salaries for foreign experts hired; and 
tax exemptions. Policies geared to keeping the currency 
	
under-valued can also be seen as an export promotion 
instrument.  
Import substitution High tariffs are applied to industries which the 
Ethiopian government wants to ‘nurture’. Tariffs are 
also in place to limit growth of the current account 
deficit and to raise tax revenues. High tariffs are 
common in the heavy manufacturing industries, but 
also for finished products in the light manufacturing 
industries, such as apparel. 
FDI attraction Several measures have been put in place to attract FDI 
in prioritized industries, in order to create employment, 
generate export earnings, and acquire technology. Such 
measures include favourable access to infrastructure 
(e.g. industrial parks and rail transport), tax 
exemptions, and subsidized land leases (in some cases, 
free land).  
Infrastructure investments 
 
Infrastructure investments especially in power 
generation and transport are geared towards industrial 
development. 
Industrial park development The Ethiopian government has undertaken a massive 
commitment to build several industrial parks, in large 
part to cater to foreign investments, but also more 
generally to ease the logistics constraints of exporting.  
Source: Hauge (2018) 
 
